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THREE GENERATIONS OF U.S. LAWYERS: GENERALISTS,
SPECIALISTS, PROJECT MANAGERS
WILLIAM D. HENDERSON*
As this Essay is being written, the legal services industry is in the
midst of a significant economic recession.  In response to harsh eco-
nomic conditions, the nation’s corporate clients have tightened their
legal budgets and altered their spending habits.  As a result, large law
firms, who in recent years hired roughly twenty-five percent of all law
school graduates, have dramatically cut the sizes of their incoming as-
sociate classes.1  In turn, highly qualified law school graduates have
expanded their job searches to markets and to employers that are nor-
mally reserved for the broad middle tier of law school graduates.  As
the downturn cascades through the entire entry-level market, a dis-
turbingly large number of recent law school graduates are either un-
employed or underemployed.  Although many of us who are middle
aged or older can remember prior economic recessions (for example,
the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and right after September 11th),
there is a palpable sense among legal employers and legal educators
that this particular recession feels different.
Does the “Great Legal Recession” that commenced in the fall of
2008 mark the beginning of a true sea change for traditional corpo-
rate law firms and, by extension, U.S. law schools?  The answer to this
question is yes.  This short Essay will walk interested readers through
some of the essential supporting data.  The story follows a relatively
simple narrative in which successive generations of U.S. corporate law-
yers have evolved from generalists, to specialists, to someday, in the
not too distant future, project managers.  Further, the story’s analyti-
cal lens is primarily one of supply and demand gradually shifting over
time.
What I think will surprise readers—particularly legal academics
and law firm partners, and less so law students and recent law school
Copyright  2011 by William D. Henderson.
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Director, Law Firms
Working Group (American Bar Foundation/Indiana Law).
1. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman Jr. & David B. Wilkins, Big-Firm Associates: Why They Go
and How to Keep Them, LAW.COM (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=12
04212425546 (reporting that twenty-five percent of students began their careers at the 250
largest law firms).
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graduates2—is my conclusion that existing hierarchies of legal em-
ployers and legal education are vulnerable.  The U.S. legal profession
is exiting a period of profound economic prosperity.  This prosperity
was set in motion by a handful of innovations in law firm structure and
lawyer training that occurred several decades ago.  These simple inno-
vations gave American lawyers the tools and the platform to help cre-
ate and grow a highly dynamic, regulated global economy.
Unfortunately, those of us who have benefited—senior law firm
partners, elite law school graduates, and the professoriate—are prone
to attribute our success to a natural ordering that flows primarily from
our perceived intelligence and merit.  Because we do not understand
the history, we underestimate the role of luck and how much we owe
to the innovations, risk taking, and sacrifice of others.  So, we are the
last to see the end of an era.  The story fits the old adage, “nothing
fails like success.”3
I. THE GENERALIST
In the United States circa 1900, the great industrialists and finan-
ciers were building empires.  At the same time that economies of
scope and scale suggested boundless opportunities for expansion and
growth, federal and state governments were beginning to grapple with
the need for regulation in order to curb some of the unwanted or
unintended consequences of the modern industrial state.4  The world
was becoming more complex.  Unfortunately, sophisticated business
lawyers were in short supply.
For a variety of interconnected reasons, the typical lawyer at the
turn of the twentieth century possessed only the skills of the general-
ist.  Sophisticated business lawyering was—and is—largely a product
of experience.  Until the late nineteenth century, most economic ac-
2. In a recent book, Michael Lewis claims that young people got the most traction out
of the opportunities provided by the Internet because they had not yet become invested in
their own professional identities. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, NEXT: THE FUTURE JUST HAP-
PENED (2002). Lewis suggests that this investment in our own identities makes us blind to
the opportunities around us. Id.  If true, the young and the disenfranchised will tend to
see the possibilities better than the rest of us.
3. I have heard this adage too many times over the years to properly locate its original
source.  It may have passed into modern parlance through the work of Arnold Toynbee.
See 1 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 327 (Oxford Univ. Press 1946) (quoting
GERALD HEARD, THE SOURCE OF CIVILIZATION 67 (1935)).
4. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1218–19 (1986) (“Roosevelt thought that federal regulation of big business was es-
sential in order to maintain a necessary distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trusts.  Thus,
he strongly advocated governmental monitoring of large-scale enterprise to ensure that
industrial growth occurred ‘naturally’ rather than through predatory practices.”).
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tivity was small in scale and local in origin, so the opportunities for on-
the-job learning were fairly limited.  In addition, legal education was
making only slow inroads into the informal apprenticeship system.
The small number of elite institutions that provided systematic train-
ing in legal doctrine made no attempt to go beyond a generalist legal
education.5  Indeed, one of the primary benefits of law school was bet-
ter preparation for state bar examinations, which tested a broad range
of legal knowledge.6
When the need for more sophisticated business lawyers presented
itself—because businesses were becoming larger, more complex, and
more heavily regulated—law firms assumed this responsibility.  Yet,
before law firms could carry out this specialized training on a large
scale, they had to solve a very difficult intrafirm incentive problem:
Once the student became the master’s equal, how should the profits
be divided?
One of the best illustrations of the lawyer mentoring problem was
the training of Paul Cravath, the brilliant business lawyer who went on
to build the elite New York City law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore
LLP.  Upon graduating from Columbia Law School, Cravath joined
the firm of Carter, Hornblower & Byrne.7  Cravath’s mentor at the
firm was Walter Carter, a highly accomplished business lawyer who
possessed a talent for locating and training great lawyers.  During the
last three decades of the nineteenth century, many of New York City’s
most influential lawyers began their careers under the tutelage of
Carter.8  And many, including Cravath, eventually became his part-
ners.9  Yet, according to one lawyer, Carter “picked his partners as
5. See, e.g., ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 286 & n.1 (1921) (“A line or gap between [the law school’s] work and genuinely
practical training is inevitable. . . .  It so happens that the schools which have committed
themselves most unreservedly to the case method are precisely those schools [the ‘na-
tional’ law schools] in which there is the widest gap between the instruction as a whole and
the immediate requirements of the local practitioner.” (footnote omitted)).  Reed’s work
was published by The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and is some-
times referred to as “The Reed Report I.”
6. See, e.g., id. at 49–50 (reporting on the role of bar examiners in “standardizing” the
law school curriculum and explaining how the curricula of “leading” law schools are “cop-
ied by other schools throughout the country”).
7. 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1947: THE
PREDECESSOR FIRMS 1819–1906, at 587 (1946).
8. See generally OTTO E. KOEGEL, WALTER S. CARTER: COLLECTOR OF YOUNG MASTERS
(1953) (chronicling the many eminent New York City lawyers whose careers can be traced
back to Carter’s law offices).
9. 1 SWAINE, supra note 7, at 588. R
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Connie Mack picked ball players, usually dropping them when they
demanded or earned as much as he did.”10
According to the official history of the Cravath, Swaine & Moore
firm, the “Cravath system” of recruitment and training was based
upon the philosophy of Walter Carter.11  Carter’s practice was to re-
cruit the top graduates from leading law schools, pay them a salary,
and develop their skills and acumen through a clerkship of several
years.12  The major innovation of Paul Cravath was to make this train-
ing system scaleable to fit the needs of sprawling industrial and finan-
cial clients.  One important part of the Cravath system was an
incentive structure that rewarded lawyers for working together as a
team for the benefit of clients.13  A second key element was an ad-
vancement system that required lawyers to master the “art of delega-
tion.”14  A third feature was the emphasis on a structured program of
training, which ensured that lawyers had someone coming up through
the ranks to whom work could be delegated.15
During the 1930s, the Cravath firm was dubbed by the press as a
“law factory.”16  Although the firm was doing a prodigious volume of
legal work, it was also creating sophisticated business lawyers.  The
stated purpose of the Cravath system was to create “a better lawyer
faster.”17  After acquiring those skills, the most remunerative place to
ply those skills was as a partner at the Cravath firm.  Yet, if an associate
failed to make partner, the firm’s excellent training opened doors at
other New York City firms.  Thus, unlike Carter’s firms, in which fully
trained lawyers typically left to form their own practices, the Cravath
10. KOEGEL, supra note 8, at 91 & n. (noting also that Carter, at the time of his death, R
claimed a disproportionate share of the firm’s profits (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11. 1 SWAINE, supra note 7, at 587. R
12. See id. (explaining that, after “training them for several years,” Carter encouraged
his clerks to “depart[ ] to practice for themselves”).
13. See 2 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1948: THE
CRAVATH FIRM SINCE 1906, at 9 (1948) (“[A]ll the business in the office must be firm busi-
ness.  This means that there is no division of fees between the firm and its associates, as
there is in many other offices.  The problem of the firm is to do effectively the business
which comes to it; by so doing that business, more comes in.  Hence, business-getting abil-
ity is not a factor in the advancement of a man within the office at any level . . . .”).
14. Id. at 5–6 (“The art of delegation in the practice of the law is difficult, requiring
nicety of balance which many men with fine minds and excellent judgment are unable to
attain. . . .  [The more a firm lawyer can strike the right balance,] the greater his value to
the firm.”).
15. See id. at 7 (noting that the Cravath system involved “keeping a current constantly
moving up in the office”).
16. See, e.g., Milton Mackaye, Profiles: Public Man, NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 1932, at 21, 21–24
(profiling Paul Cravath and referring to his firm as “the factory”).
17. 2 SWAINE, supra note 13, at 4–5. R
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firm was stable and could continue to grow in response to client de-
mand.18  Although it may not be entirely accurate to ascribe the inven-
tion of this method of workplace organization to Paul Cravath,19
virtually all major business law firms organized themselves along simi-
lar principles.20
II. THE SPECIALIST
Although the seeds for the specialist era were in place by the mid-
twentieth century, in terms of sheer numbers, the legal profession was
overwhelmingly comprised of solo practitioners who earned a very
modest living.  According to a national census of lawyers drawn from
the 1949 Martindale-Hubbell directory (estimated to be ninety per-
cent complete at the time), there were 169,489 lawyers working in the
United States.21  Among the roughly 152,600 working in private prac-
tice, 68.6% were identified as solo practitioners.22  Of the lawyers
working in law firms, roughly 40,500 were classified as partners and a
mere 7,500 (or 4.9% of the private practice bar) were classified as
associates.23  The median salary of a lawyer working in private practice
was $5,199, which was less than the $5,518 median salary paid to a
lawyer employed by a government entity.24  In contrast, lawyers work-
ing in large law firms of nine or more partners enjoyed median in-
18. The stability of the Cravath system for all stakeholders is reflected by Professor
Charles Reich’s characterization of his time at the Cravath firm in the early 1950s:
[Once inside the firm, the associates learned that] making partner was not such a
big issue after all.  We were all told that while few associates could expect to re-
main permanently at the firm itself, we could all count on well-paid future em-
ployment at one of the many corporate legal offices or regional law firms that had
ongoing relationships with Cravath.  The message was: Excellent work is ex-
pected, but the pressure is off. Associates were safely and comfortably on the in-
side for life.  Inclusion was more important than competition.
Charles Reich, Cravath Veteran Recalls Law Firm Life of Yesteryear, LAW.COM (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id=1197626690782.
19. My colleague Marc Galanter has suggested that Cravath may have been blessed with
the best historian, his partner Robert Swaine. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNA-
MENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 10 (1991).
20. See id. at 9–10 (discussing the creation and influence of the Cravath system);
MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 20–23
(2004) (discussing the origins and influence of the Cravath firm, which “provided a struc-
ture whose influence persists to this day”).
21. Albert P. Blaustein, The 1949 Lawyer Count: A Preliminary Statement, 36 A.B.A. J. 370,
370 & nn.2–3 (1950).
22. Id. at 372 (author’s calculations).
23. Id. (author’s calculations).
24. William Weinfeld, Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Com-
merce, Income of Lawyers, 1929–48, SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1949, at 18, 21 tbl.6 & n.1.
The median income for a salaried lawyer in a law firm (meaning, an associate) was $4,986.
Id. at 21 tbl.6.
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comes 400% higher.25  But their numbers were slight, as they
comprised less than 1.5% of all lawyers working in private practice.26
These lawyers had become relatively wealthy because their workplace
organization enabled them to become specialists.27
During the early post-war period, as the U.S. industrial economy
boomed, law firms with an established business clientele were in an
excellent position to prosper and grow.  Along with unprecedented
business opportunities, clients were facing novel legal problems
brought about by the scale and breadth of business operations, the
need for new methods of finance, and the proliferation of state and
federal regulations.  Most companies relied upon lawyers from a sin-
gle outside law firm to handle all the company’s burgeoning legal
needs.  As firms reacted to the clients’ need for more specialized ser-
vices, they were also in a position to train the next generation of so-
phisticated business lawyers.28  Because clients were dependent on the
expertise of their outside legal counsel, and because the size and
scope of the legal issues continued to grow, clients were usually willing
to pay for the training of junior lawyers.29
Indeed, for much of the post-war period, the larger corporate law
firms have had the wind at their backs.  According to government sta-
tistics, for the last several decades, expenditures on legal services have
become an increasingly larger share of our nation’s gross domestic
product, increasing from roughly 0.4% in 1978 to 1.8% in 2003.30
Data from the Chicago Lawyers I and II studies, which examined a
large random sample of Chicago area lawyers in 1975 and 1995,
25. Id. at 21 tbls.6 & 7 (reporting a median net income of $21,500) (author’s
calculations).
26. Id. at 21 tbl.7.
27. For a firsthand account of the steady movement toward specialization from the
perspective of a business lawyer who began his law career in the 1920s and opined on the
importance of associate training sixty years later, see generally THEODORE VOORHEES, ON
TRAINING ASSOCIATES 61–70 (1989).
28. In reality, legal specialists are created by law firms and other legal services organiza-
tions, including government agencies and nonprofits.  Although these opportunities are
often meted out by educational credentials, law schools play virtually no role in this
process.
29. Cf. Gene Koo, New Skills, New Learning: Legal Education and the Promise of Technology
(Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harv. Univ., Research Pub. No. 2007-4, Mar. 2007),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2007/05/koo (“Clients are in-
creasingly unwilling to pay for training of associates, e.g. prohibiting firms from billing for
young attorneys’ attendance at client-facing meetings.  New lawyers’ involvement in such
meetings has long been an important apprenticeship activity.”).
30. Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF.
L. REV. 1369, 1378 & fig.1 (2006).  Professor Marc Galanter also compared the growth of
GDP and receipts of legal services industry between 1967 and 2002, finding that legal ser-
vices grew nearly three times faster than the overall economy. Id. at 1379 & fig.2.
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strongly suggest that virtually all the corresponding gains in real in-
come went to lawyers working in large law firms of 100 lawyers or
more.31  The importance of luck and timing in allocating these spoils
is evidenced by the fact that among the 100 largest U.S. law firms
based on revenues (the Am Law 100), the average “name partner” was
born in 1895 and died in 1964.32  In general, a precondition to being
a large firm today is the existence of a business clientele several de-
cades earlier.33  Thereafter, the advantage compounded over time.
Over the last three decades, the 250 largest firms based on size (the
National Law Journal 250) have grown by more than 500%.34
Despite the longevity and prosperity of these large firms, the
background economic conditions have gradually shifted, thus chang-
ing the relative payoffs of all participants.  With the rise of the general
counsel position in the 1970s, in-house lawyers assumed the position
of trusted advisors to the company’s owners or senior executives while
outside law firms were called upon for their specialized skills and tech-
nical expertise.35  The advent of a vibrant legal press, which seemed to
come into being immediately after the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,36 chronicled the successes of
individual lawyers and the accomplishments of firm practice groups.37
31. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE BAR (1982); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE BAR 99 (2005) (reporting that between 1975 and 1995 large law firms were the
“clear winner in the market for legal services” as the “income share declined in every prac-
tice setting except firms with one hundred or more lawyers”).
32. Marc Galanter & William D. Henderson, Understanding Corporate Law Firms by
Reading the Shingle (unpublished manuscript presented at the 2010 Law & Society An-
nual Meeting in Chicago, IL) (on file with authors).
33. Only one firm (Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP) has name partners who
are baby boomers.  In general, the large, highly profitable young firms have benefited from
the rise of the legal press, which could report the successes of their name partners, who
have the advantage of being alive.
34. See William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis of Lateral Law-
yer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1396–97 (2009) (providing statistics on the growth of the nation’s
largest law firms).
35. See, e.g., JAMES C. FREUND, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, SMELL TEST: STORIES AND
ADVICE ON LAWYERING 203 (2008) (observing “the power that inside general counsel started
to exercise in the 1970s, especially in terms of such matters as selecting outside counsel”
and noting that “[t]his power was greatly expanded in the ‘80s, ‘90s, and beyond”); John P.
Heinz et al., The Scale of Justice: Observations on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27
ANN. REV. SOC. 337, 347–48 (2001) (describing how the bureaucratization of the in-house
lawyer role reduced the role of outside law over corporate decision making).
36. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that Arizona’s ban on lawyer advertising was a
violation of the First Amendment).
37. William D. Henderson, Law Firm Strategies for Human Capital: Past, Present, Future, 52
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 73, 84 (2010) (“The surge in demand for corporate legal services
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With this flood of new information, general counsel increasingly
adopted the perspective that they were shopping for individual law-
yers rather than law firms.38  In turn, partners with a strong client base
capitalized on this change by demanding a larger share of their billing
as they moved laterally among law firms.  Partners in marquee prac-
tice areas, such as mergers and acquisitions, private equity, venture
capital, white collar crime, securities enforcement, and intellectual
property litigation, have fared the best.39
This vibrant market for specialized lawyers, however, also has con-
sequences for junior career lawyers and recent law school graduates.
In reality, the specialized technical skills young lawyers have learned
from their large law firm training have gradually lost their “resale
value” as the number of associates who fall off the partner track has
increased relative to supply.40  As the size of the corporate bar has
expanded over the last several decades, the total volume of technically
sophisticated lawyers (specialists) is at an all-time high.41  This reality
strongly reduces the incentive of clients to subsidize the training of
entry-level lawyers, particularly at inflated pay scales that are discon-
nected from the value provided to clients.42
also coincided with the rise of the legal press in the late 1970s, which reported on high-
profile legal cases and transactions, created a limelight for star lawyers, and facilitated com-
parisons of law firm size and economic fortunes.”).
38. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 20, at 33 (noting that “companies are more concerned R
with retaining individual lawyers than specific firms”); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law
Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 385 (1985) (“The catchphrase now
is: ‘Shop for a lawyer, not a law firm.’”).
39. For a detailed discussion of the rise of the lateral marketplace, including a break-
down of movement by practice area and geography, see generally Marc Galanter & William
Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1867 (2008), and Henderson & Bierman, supra note 34. R
40. See PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE POWERHOUSE
LAW FIRMS 216–21 (1982) (explaining that specialized legal skills no longer guaranteed
employment unless a lawyer was able to use those skills to bring business into a firm in the
early 1980s).
41. See Henderson & Bierman, supra note 34, at 1396 (describing the increase in the R
number of partners and associates in large law firms between 1978 and 2008); see also
Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
631, 659–60 & n.157, 690 (2005) (conducting detailed interviews with partners in National
Law Journal 250 firms and noting that all “agreed that being a good lawyer is not enough
to make equity partner in today’s large firms, and in a number of firms, it is also not
enough to make non-equity partner”).  Kirkland also commented that “[l]arge firms view
good lawyers as expendable.  As one equity partner put it, ‘You can’t swing a dead cat in
New York without hitting a good lawyer.’” Id. at 690.
42. See, e.g., Attila Berry, Closing in on $200K, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at 1, 1 (re-
porting comments made by Susan Hackett, “senior vice president and general counsel of
the Association of Corporate Counsel,” that “many clients see the salary war as having
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The end of the specialist era is the flipside of the same dynamic
that gave rise to it in the first instance: The relative supply of sophisti-
cated business lawyers has increased relative to demand, thanks to the
growth of large law firms and the training they provided over a period
of several decades (albeit at the clients’ expense).  Now, however, the
amount of money spent on legal services by large corporate clients is
vast.  And, this purchasing power is disproportionately centralized
among a few hundred general counsel.
Although formally trained as lawyers, these general counsel are
effectively senior corporate managers whose goal is to optimize the
benefit of a fixed legal budget—indeed, it is typically a key element of
their remuneration.  The end of the specialist era is marked by gen-
eral counsel’s use of the overcapacity of specialists to drive down over-
all costs to their corporation.43  The beginning of the project manager
era—which I believe is now dawning—is marked by sophisticated cor-
porate counsel looking for methods of workplace organization and
process that will deliver higher quality legal inputs and outputs (a
bundle of both services and products) for a predictable fee.  Further,
as the project manager gains momentum, the legal service market will
begin to behave like other sectors of the economy—the cost of these
inputs and outputs will decline over time.
III. THE PROJECT MANAGER
It is hard to decipher the end of one era and the dawning of
another when all the relevant ideas and data come from books, arti-
cles, and a computer screen.  I doubt that I would be willing to make
this call if I had not wandered outside my office to listen to a wide
range of industry participants talk about their businesses.44  Further, I
would be more reluctant to stake out a bold theory of industry change
if I personally had not witnessed a transition of similar magnitude.
But, I grew up in Cleveland, Ohio during the 1970s and early 1980s,
when the U.S. automotive industry peaked and then headed into de-
reached an insane level and feel that the value-to-cost ratio of new associates is edging on
untenable”).
43. See, e.g., Roy E. Hofer, Reflections on the Legal Profession, EXPERIENCE, Winter 2008, at
30, 32 (quoting the name partner of a large firm specializing in intellectual property as
remarking that “[m]any corporate clients now consider their outside lawyers as a fungible
commodity.  They pit firms against each other in beauty contests.  They assume that the
quality of the legal work is equal, and therefore in these contests look for discounts, fixed
fees, knowledge of the client’s business, [and] how fast phone calls will be returned . . . .”).
44. See generally Susan Helper, Economists and Field Research: “You Can Observe a Lot Just by
Watching,” AM. ECON. REV., May 2000, at 228 (discussing the value of fieldwork to economic
research).
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cline.  At the time, it would have been hard to imagine how quickly
the industry would unravel.  As a region, we believed that things would
rebound or stabilize.  We were wrong.
In this final Part, I relate two concrete examples of how the tradi-
tional pyramidal law firm is being undercut by innovations—one by a
client and another by a legal services firm—using innovative technol-
ogy, project management, and process improvement.  These examples
reflect modes of problem solving that are completely foreign to the
training and socialization of most successful corporate law firm law-
yers—and that is why they are so disruptive to established hierar-
chies.45  In addition, drawing upon my observations of the automotive
industry, I suggest that the supplier relations of the Japanese versus
U.S. automakers during the 1980s and 1990s provide law firms with
relatively simple, albeit stylized, blueprints for success or failure in the
years to come.
My first example comes from the in-house legal department at
Cisco Systems, Inc., a Fortune 100 technology company.46  The com-
pany has a relatively large legal budget (approximately $160 million),
but the General Counsel, Mark Chandler, is expected to contain costs
on par with any other department in the organization.  One strategy
the legal department has used to contain costs is to bring in-house
legal work that is core to the company’s competitive advantage (mean-
ing, build rather than buy).  As the legal department grew, the Gen-
eral Counsel and his staff wanted to capture the full learning of each
matter so that each similar, subsequent matter could build upon it as a
starting point.  One of the company’s licensing attorneys, Steve Har-
mon, who has an information technology background, was asked to
help architect a new legal automation and knowledge management
platform.  The goal of the project was to better archive information,
capture the full context of prior work, facilitate information sharing,
develop internal expertise, save time, and obtain better legal
outcomes.
45. For a broader theory of how industry leaders fail to adapt to disruptive technology,
see CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).  As law professor and technology expert Richard Suss-
kind has stated: “‘It is not easy, of course, to convince a roomful of millionaires that their
business model is ultimately misconceived or that their practices face greater threats to
prosperity than ever before’ . . . .  ‘They will cling dearly to the old economy until there are
overwhelming reasons to do otherwise.’”  Mark Voorhees, Tech’s Prince of Darkness Strikes,
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 22, 2001, at B8.
46. This first example is based on my own experience and conversations with the law-
yers in Cisco’s legal department.
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Most interestingly, Cisco’s legal department promises to provide
an answer to any legal question asked by any other corporate depart-
ment “as long as it is asked in the proper form [i.e., inside the tool].”
Answering a question via phone may be convenient for a Cisco em-
ployee in another department, but working outside the knowledge
management tool undercuts the legal department’s ability to generate
better, faster, and less expensive answers in the future.  One of the
most effective ways to improve service to all internal stakeholders is to
make sure that company lawyers are not solving the same legal prob-
lem multiple times.  Further, the work of outside legal counsel gets
integrated into the platform.  Younger attorneys build their profile in
the department by updating and annotating content and serving as ad
hoc problem solvers to others in the organization.
By faithfully following this approach, virtually all of the com-
pany’s core legal functions are at the fingertips of the company’s en-
tire in-house legal department.  The more the tool gets used, the
more valuable it becomes.  Although the system already has enormous
internal network benefits, it requires remarkably little high-level su-
pervision.  Its management and updating are diffused through the or-
ganization, thus becoming organic to the overall work flow.
When I was walked through this process, several questions came
to mind.  I asked one of the in-house lawyers whether, after working in
this environment, she could ever imagine herself billing 2,000 hours
per year in a conventional law firm.  “No,” was the reply.  She contin-
ued, “This place has ruined me for law firms.  I now need collabora-
tion and efficiency to be happy in my job.”  Hearing the answer to that
question, I asked Steve Harmon, the lawyer charged with developing
the platform, whether the company considered turning it into a com-
mercial product for other in-house legal departments.  His reply sur-
prised me:
I wish I did not have to build tools.  They are not core to our
business.  I would prefer to work on licensing agreements for
our company’s core products [his primary area of expertise
as a lawyer].  But the law firms are not interested in building
tools for us.  So we had to build them.47
47. The basic framework developed by Cisco has been turned into a commercial prod-
uct utilized by other large legal departments.  Some of these innovations are discussed and
utilized through Legal OnRamp’s online community. See generally LEGAL ONRAMP,
http://legalonramp.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (describing Legal OnRamp’s
“[c]ollaboration system for in-house counsel and invited outside lawyers and third party
service providers,” which contains “a rapidly growing collection of content and technology
resources”).
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In my opinion, the key takeaway from this exchange is that when
legal expenditures become sufficiently large, the company is going to
treat them like any other variable expenses—the company will focus
on controlling them.  Further, if enough money is on the table, even a
legal department may be willing to vertically integrate noncore aspects
of its business.  This will only happen, however, when no supplier
steps up to offer the desired product and service.  Cisco, not surpris-
ingly, is a pretty demanding client.  Mark Chandler expects the com-
pany’s outside law firms to help with the goal of doing more with less.
Some law firm partners might argue that they would prefer to work
for clients who are less demanding and focus less on cost contain-
ment.  I can understand this sentiment, but it does not belong in any
long-term business plan.  Like water running downhill, best practices
eventually get adopted by companies that want to stay in business.48
My second example of game-changing innovation came to my at-
tention when two principals of Novus Law LLC visited my Project
Management class to talk about their business.49  Novus Law, which
was started less than five years ago, specializes in reviewing, managing,
and analyzing documents for litigation, investigations, and transac-
tion-based due diligence.  Prior to that, the principals (who have
M.B.A. degrees, not law degrees) led the business process outsourcing
practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers.  There they spun-off and reen-
gineered the nonstrategic work processes of several Fortune 500 com-
panies, making them much more efficient and profitable using the
exact same workers that would have otherwise been laid off.  When
those spinoffs were eventually sold, the principals looked for another
promising business opportunity.  After two years of patient evaluation,
it took them one day—yes, one day—to commit to using those same
reengineering techniques in the legal industry.  Why?  Because in
their review of industry data, never before had they witnessed such an
enormous disconnect in perceived value between clients and service
providers.
In just a few short years, Novus Law has enjoyed considerable suc-
cess in partnering with major corporate legal departments and Am
48. Through reading and observation, I have gradually concluded that efficiency is
often at odds with comfort and familiarity of settled opinion.  Efficiency, however, gener-
ally fares better in the long run. Cf. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN
UNFAIR GAME 88–96 (2003) (documenting in painstaking detail how the ability to win
more baseball games through the use of statistics—“sabermetrics”—was summarily ignored
by the baseball establishment for nearly twenty years before it became mainstream virtually
overnight).
49. This second example is based on the visit of two principals from Novus Law LLC to
my own Project Management class.
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Law 200 law firms.  Their work has been relied upon in complex civil,
white-collar criminal, and major class actions and multidistrict litiga-
tion in federal courts.  What is the value proposition for clients?  Sixty
percent lower cost than a traditional law firm and near perfect qual-
ity—far better than any large law firm with an army of top law school
graduates.50
Although a small portion of the cost savings comes from using
less expensive lawyers in the United States and abroad, the efficiency
and quality is entirely a function of world class project management
and process engineering.  At Novus Law, reviewing, managing, and
analyzing documents has been broken down into nearly 1,000 deci-
sion points, which are arrayed in an optimal order and collapsed into
a smaller number of highly efficient steps using business practices
found in accounting, aviation, healthcare, manufacturing, and other
industries.  In addition, the lawyers doing the work are given an engi-
neered work environment that is optimized for comfort, efficiency,
and mental accuracy.  The heavy reliance on process is not just about
speed and accuracy—customized knowledge management and intelli-
gence gathering tools enable lawyers to better identify fact patterns
that can drive the outcome of a case.  Every aspect of cost and quality,
including team communication and collaboration, is captured by a
system of statistically driven metrics.  Lawyers are exposed to a con-
stant feedback loop on their own performance, which enables them to
continuously improve.  As they progress, they enjoy higher compensa-
tion.  Remarkably, lawyers with as little as three years of experience
have become shareholders in the firm.
With the advent of e-discovery, which has exploded the scope of
discoverable information, many large law firms have responded by
building out litigation units that rely on either staff or contract attor-
neys, who are cheaper than the traditional associates paid on the
50. This claim of quality is documented by taking a statistically-based random sample of
work product and having a law firm redo it in an effort to identify errors.  This firm’s
accuracy rate vacillated between 99.8% and 100%, whereas the typical Am Law 100 law
firm hit 78% to 91%.  E-mail from Ray Bayley, Chief Exec. Officer, Novus Law LLP, to
William Henderson, Professor of Law, Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 2011, 5:51 PM) (on
file with author) (work product accuracy confirmed in e-mail).  Because ethical sanctions
often turn on erroneous claims of privilege during discovery, the benefits to the client or
the lead outside counsel can be enormous.
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$160,000 plus pay scale.51  From a distance, this BigLaw model looks
safer than “sending your documents to India.”52
If the value proposition is just labor arbitrage, that argument may
have staying power until all of the economies of using less expensive
labor are realized.  But Novus Law’s real comparative advantage is a
project management and process orientation that dramatically in-
creases quality.  Its process, quality, and knowledge management sys-
tem, which recently won a global InnovAction Award from the College
of Law Practice Management, enables its attorneys to collaborate on
factual theories at the same time that privilege review is being per-
formed.  This one-touch, multifaceted approach to processing infor-
mation can supply the client with a basis for an early resolution or
dismissal, which can further reduce the cost of litigation.
The fact that Novus Law can measure and warrantee quality, and
offer price certainty, endears it to large corporate clientele.  This
model does not require the pay scale of a developing country to be
competitive.  Yet, the fact that measurable quality is identical between
U.S. and overseas attorneys suggests that more work is likely to head
overseas in the years to come.  These dynamics have enormous impli-
cations for traditional law firms, which will reduce the number of en-
try-level hires.  This produces a general “graying” of the corporate bar
and a large cohort of lawyers who will be less inclined to reinvent
themselves.  And this, unfortunately, reminds me of Cleveland.
During my undergraduate days at Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity, I was part of a team of field researchers studying the automotive
supply chain in Northeastern Ohio.  At the time, the Japanese car
companies were building cars in the United States using lean produc-
tion methods that emphasized teamwork, collaboration, and informa-
tion sharing to continuously improve process, quality, and
efficiency.53  The evidence was overwhelming that lean methods pro-
duced superior results, but adoption was slow and episodic among the
51. See, e.g., Gina Passarella, Outside Shot: In-House Departments, Law Firms Rely More on
Project Attorneys, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 6, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArti-
clePA.jsp?id=1202463299917 (discussing how many “corporate law departments” have be-
gun to use “project- or contract-based attorneys to help handle an increased workload on a
shrunken budget”).
52. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Value of “Thinking Like a Lawyer,” 70 MD. L. REV.
390, 414 (2011) (“[C]lients with a short-term perspective may favor more outsourcing . . .
but [that] development[ ] might not be in the long-term best interests of clients.  The use
of . . . alternative business forms . . . should be guided by the goal of improving both the
efficiency and the quality of legal services.”).
53. For a comprehensive overview of the lean production methods in the automotive
industry, see JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990).
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Big Three automakers.  In Northeastern Ohio, virtually all the parts
makers supplied Ford, Chrysler, or General Motors.
We started this research with a long list of questions regarding
how environmental risks were being allocated between buyer and sup-
plier.  We hoped to hear examples of how information sharing pro-
duced innovative solutions to difficult problems.  Instead, we heard a
steady stream of stories in which powerful buyers—starting at the top
with the Big Three—imposed annual reductions in the amount they
were willing to pay for their automotive components.  Because low
wages achieved through union busting tactics were often given as the
company’s primary competitive advantage, we were not surprised to
learn that one of their biggest challenges was finding enough tool and
die makers to keep the factories operating smoothly.  The low wages
and the emphasis on cost control meant that neither the employers
nor the unions wanted to bear the cost of training.  So, the number of
highly skilled tradesmen evaporated, weakening the ability of the en-
tire region to compete on the basis of quality.
I now see the same adversarial dynamics setting in between many
large U.S. corporations and their outside counsel.  Rather than setting
up long-term relationships in which information and the benefits of
innovation will be shared between supplier and buyer, many general
counsel are pressuring their law firms for discounted fees.54  Clients
are also refusing to pay for first- or second-year associates.55  Law firms
can attempt to prop up profitability by slashing entry-level hiring and
by cutting costs on professional development along with other nones-
54. See, e.g., Amy Kolz, Capitalism’s Next Frontier, AM LAW., Nov. 2010, at 84, 87 (report-
ing an ex-managing partner’s frustration that “[c]lients were hell-bent on ever-increasing
discounts”); Claire Zillman, The New Normal, AM. LAW., Dec. 2010, at 66, 68–69 (noting that
almost half of the large corporations surveyed in the Association of Corporate Counsel
study reported that ninety-five percent of their legal spending on outside law firms in 2010
will be based on the billable hour, but also noting that eighty-five percent of the corpora-
tions reported that more clients are requesting discounted rates); Michael Kozubek, Alter-
native Fee Arrangements Vary in Effectiveness, Experts Say, INSIDECOUNS., (Apr. 1, 2010), http://
www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/April-2010/Pages/Alternative-Fee-Arrangements-
Vary-in-Effectiveness-Experts-Say.aspx (quoting John Weber, the general manager of CT
TyMetrix, a large e-billing company that analyzes payment to law firms, as stating that
“[t]he most widely-used AFA, the volume discount, is not particularly effective in reducing
cost” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. See, e.g., Nate Raymond, State Bar Launches Task Force to Examine Changes in Profession,
N.Y. L.J., June 25, 2010, at 6 (quoting a partner of a large New York firm as stating that “my
own clients . . . say they don’t want first- and second-year lawyers on their matters” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Zillman, supra note 54, at 68 (reporting on a recent survey of R
law firm leaders, in which “nearly 47 percent of respondents said that clients have refused
to pay for work done by first- or second-year associates” and noting that this refusal was a
“part of clients’ strategy to shift economic risk back to law firms”).
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sential expenses.  But in the long run, an organization—or, worst yet,
an industry—cannot credibly compete on the basis of quality when it
underinvests in its most important asset—legal talent.
A better outcome for the clients and the U.S. legal profession
would be a movement toward continuous improvement (meaning,
lower costs, faster cycle time, better leveraging of technology, and
higher quality).56  Creating the required risk-sharing relationships,
however, takes time, ingenuity, and effort.  Similar to the U.S. auto-
motive industry, the prosperity of the last several decades makes it ex-
tremely difficult for law firms to make this transition.  Rather than
invest in an uncertain future or change ingrained work habits to em-
brace tools such as project management and process improvement,
the temptation for most law firm partners is to believe that the current
downward pressure on fees is merely cyclical.  And without the buy-in
of partners, law firm leaders are powerless to create a different future.
My analogy to the U.S. automotive industry is meant to suggest
that the American legal profession is subject to the same laws of sup-
ply and demand (and inertia and complacency) as every other sector
of the nation’s economy.  It is not difficult to imagine that the oppor-
tunities for growth are likely to flow disproportionately to a new gen-
eration of legal service organizations.  These organizations may look
more like vendors than professionals.  Moreover, they may not neces-
sarily employ U.S. lawyers.  Then, the structural problems that are cur-
rently putting stress on U.S. law firms will soon become a threat to the
survival of at least some U.S. law schools.  Law schools can respond by
reinventing themselves to help mitigate the challenges of legal em-
ployers.  If they can pull it off, they are likely to find themselves at the
top of a brand new hierarchy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has sketched out a simple historical continuum in
which the typical U.S. lawyer has transitioned from a generalist work-
ing as a solo practitioner to a specialist working in a law firm with
other specialists.  The law firms themselves created a system of work-
place organization that effectively created more specialists in order to
service the business needs of their rapidly growing business clients.  As
the clients grew and prospered throughout the twentieth century, so
56. Cf. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 33–39 (2008) (arguing that the natural pull of all markets, including legal ser-
vices, is toward greater automation and commoditization because companies who are the
first to move down this road, or continuously innovate, enjoy enormous profit-making op-
portunities, thus forcing their competitors to compete to survive).
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did U.S. law firms.  Yet, because the amount of money flowing to U.S.
law firms has become so large and the supply of sophisticated techni-
cal lawyers now exceeds the demand, corporate clients are pressuring
their outside counsel to do more with less.  This requires U.S. lawyers
to adopt a more systems- and process-oriented approach to legal
problems.
Thus, over the next several years, lawyers working for large corpo-
rate clients will increasingly layer the skills of project manager on top
of their specialized legal knowledge.  To the extent that lawyers resist
this gravitational pull, they will lose their seat at the economic table.
Amidst the coming economic tumult, we can expect to see many excit-
ing innovations in legal education and in the provision of legal ser-
vices.  At least some of us will figure out how to do more with less.  In
the process, old hierarchies will fall and new hierarchies will be cre-
ated.  For the alert and ambitious young lawyer, law student, or law
professor, the next several years could provide you with your big
break.  My advice is simple: pay attention, and most importantly, learn
to think for yourself.
